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Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: Identity and Status in International Society 
 
Christopher R. Hughes 
 
(In Dafydd Fell and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds.) , Taiwan Studies Revisited, Routledge: 




This account of the writing of Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: Identity and Status in 
International Society describes the challenges and opportunities of doing research while 
living through the confusion of the early stage of Taiwan’s democratization, the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of China as a superpower. It attempts to convey how the project 
became successful when the research question was formulated with reference to an 
appropriate body of nationalist theory and when the appropriate method was found for 
making sense of a rapidly growing body of evidence. By being in the right place and at the 
right time, what students often think of as dry academic tasks of engaging with theory and 
method became the source of the excitement and creativity that led to the development of the 
original concept of Taiwan as ‘a post-nationalist entity in an intermediate state’. 
 
 
It would be nice to be able to claim that Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: Identity and Status 
in International Society, was the result of a well-thought-out research plan. A more honest 
account is that it was the outcome of the author being lucky enough to be in the right place 
and at the right time. This makes it very much a snapshot of Taiwan at a particularly exciting 
period in its own political history, which occurred as the world entered the post-Cold War 
period.  
 
To explain how I decided on the topic, it is necessary to say a bit about the circuitous route 
that brought me into contact with Taiwan. As an undergraduate and graduate student, I had 
studied intellectual history with a special focus on the history of political thought. An initial 
interest in China had been sparked when I had touched on Chinese philosophy and art. I had 
also come into contact with nationalist theory, especially when I studied under Elie Kedouri 
and Kenneth Minogue at the LSE. One book that had made a particularly deep impression 
was Joseph Levenson’s monumental trilogy, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, which 
opened my eyes to the remarkable story of the identity crisis involved in China’s painful 
transition to modernity (Levenson 1958). 
 
In the early 1980s I also decided to start to learn Mandarin Chinese at evening school and 
with a private tutor. This was partly due to academic inquisitiveness but also because China 
was beginning to become more accessible for travellers and increasingly salient in the media 
in the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘Reform and Opening.’ I then took the leap in 
1986 and spent just under a year backpacking around most of China, including Xinjiang and 
Tibet. I think the first time Taiwan entered my consciousness was when someone waved a 
Taiwanese bank note in front of me on a train and asked what they could do with it in a rather 
nervous fashion. 
 
Those were the heady days when the government of the reformist CCP general secretary, Hu 
Yaobang (胡耀邦), unleashed an explosion of creative and eclectic thinking across the arts 
and politics. I became involved with the movement of young experimental artists and planned 
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to help them to gain exposure for their work in the UK. To develop my knowledge further, I 
registered for the MA Area Studies (Far East) at SOAS in 1987, taking courses in Chinese 
politics, art and archaeology and mediaeval philosophy.  
 
There were no courses in Taiwan studies in those days. I even recall the great Mao scholar, 
Stuart Schram, refusing to allow a student to give a presentation on the topic in his class on 
Chinese politics. But Taiwan began to become a story in the news when Chiang Ching-kuo 
（蔣經國）passed away. With my interest further stimulated by talking to Taiwanese 
students I decided to travel to the island to improve my language skills at the Mandarin 
Training Centre at Taiwan National Normal University. 
 
Taiwan was an exciting but confusing place to be in 1988. After Chiang’s death, Lee Teng-
hui (李登輝) had taken over the Presidency. The situation was quite surreal, as demands for 
democratization grew while the parliamentary chambers were populated by representatives 
who had been elected in China in the 1940s and refused to relinquish power until they could 
return there to hold new elections. The social infrastructure had deteriorated badly after 
decades of neglect by a ruling party who proudly proclaimed that its aim was not to stay in 
Taiwan but to ‘unify China under the Three Principles of the People’, as billboards outside 
government buildings constantly reminded the population. It was not hard to understand why 
people should ignore such abstract political principles and take to the streets to demand better 
governance. In the crowded suburb of Yungho （永和）, where I lived, there were no public 
spaces, no metro system and very few outlets that resembled modern shops. The contrast with 
thriving Yongho today, with its restored parks and good transport links attests to the often-
overlooked achievements of democracy at the local level.  
 
As I began to think about doing a PhD, it was obvious that the focus would have to be related 
to democratisation in some way. How I looked at this was also influenced by the comparison 
of what I had witnessed in China. Much like in Taiwan, society there had been boiling over 
with demands for political change as a new generation refused to accept the myths of the 
past. This came to a bloody end when dissent was crushed in the 1989 Beijing Massacre. At 
the time I was sitting in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Plaza, where the crowds had been in 
contact with the students in Tiananmen Square through a video link to a large screen. To this 
day I do not know what happened to the friends I had made during my visit there, some of 
whom were students at the Beijing Academy of Fine Arts, where the ‘Goddess of 
Democracy’ was constructed. 
 
The questions began to grow, therefore, as to how these societies could relate to each other as 
they moved in such different directions. The contrast only became starker when students in 
Taiwan occupied the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Plaza to call for elections to the National 
Assembly. When the KMT literally wheeled its veteran members into the chamber to oppose 
the demands for change, President Lee eventually threw himself behind the calls for reform. 
Democratization in Taiwan entered a new and exciting stage just as China was put under 
martial law and the Communist Party began to look anew to Chinese nationalism to rebuild 
its legitimacy.  
 
Theory, Methods and fieldwork 
 
With a whole set of vague questions starting to gel in my mind I decided to return to London 
and get the academic training to undertake a more systematic analysis. In stark contrast with 
the flourishing of Taiwan studies in the UK today, it proved almost impossible find a 
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supervisor. It was by pure luck that I happened to be listening to the radio one day and there 
was an interview about Taiwan with Michael Yahuda, a world-leading expert on Chinese 
foreign policy in the International Relations Department at the LSE. I contacted him and after 
some discussion, he agreed to supervise me. This was a generous decision because neither of 
us had a clear idea about how to approach the complex and rapidly developing situation in 
Taiwan.  
 
The first problem with framing the research was the lack of secondary academic literature. 
When I conducted my initial bibliographic search the results were paltry, to put it generously. 
I think there were only two books of much use in the various libraries attached to the 
University of London. One of these was Thomas Gold’s State and Society in the Taiwan 
Miracle (Gold 1986) without which I would not have known where to start; the other was 
Chiu Hungdah’s China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis, a 1972 book 
on the ROC and international law, which was extremely useful and important for background 
information, but somewhat out of datev (Chiu 1972). Other books, such as George Kerr’s 
Formosa Betrayed, were very useful for gaining insights into Taiwanese identity, but very 
out of date. In general, though, the study of Taiwan had been dominated by the Cold War 
concerns with geostrategy and security studies, with little work done on deeper issues of 
social and political change.  
 
Deciding to do a PhD on an unfolding situation does also have advantages. The greatest is 
that it is much easier to make the claim originality that is required for a successful thesis. I 
would not have been so lucky if I had come to the topic a few years later, when a new wave 
of books by pioneering authors such as Alan Wachman (whose early death was a tragic blow 
to all of us) and Shelley Rigger was appearing, triggered by interests similar to my own 
(Wachman 1994; Rigger 1999). 
 
Luckily the theoretical approach I decided to take ensured that my work would add to that 
literature, rather than just restate what began to be published. While students often bemoan an 
apparent preoccupation with theory in the social sciences, I cannot stress enough how 
important this was in helping me to make sense of the mass of empirical evidence being 
generated in Taiwan. Having struggled in my first year, my eureka moment came when I 
joined the seminar on nationalism held every week at the LSE by Anthony Smith and James 
Mayall. This was a crowded and intensely interesting group of students and faculty, inspired 
by the nationalist movements that were breaking the political mould around the world after 
the Cold War. It rekindled the interest nationalism that I had earlier developed when studying 
under Elie Kedouri and Kenneth Minogue.  
 
It was while working in this context that it suddenly became clear to me that what I was 
really interested in was the implications of democratisation in Taiwan for Chinese 
nationalism. This question might seem rather obvious today, but throughout the Cold War 
nationalism had been eclipsed by the struggle between the superpowers, with a few brave 
exceptions, such as Benedict Anderson (1991 [1983]) Elie Kedouri (1961) and Anthony 
Smith (1986). Even the study of Chinese nationalism did not become as serious subject of 
academic study until the wave of books that was triggered by the ‘new nationalism’ of the 
1990s. 
 
I was fortunate, therefore, that the debates of the post-Cold War years certainly provided 
some concepts to bring to the study of Taiwan. Anderson’s idea of the nation as an ‘imagined 
community’ was particularly useful for focusing on the politics of national identity. Anthony 
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Smith’s distinction of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic nationalism’ was also useful for developing this 
question, insofar as it showed how the claim made by the CCP and KMT that the populations 
on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were obliged to unify due to blood ties, which has very 
different implications from the voluntaristic form of ‘civic nationalism’ upon which the 
liberal concept of citizenship is based (Smith 1986).  
 
It was Ernest Gellner’s definition of nationalism as the principle that ‘the political and the 
national unit should be congruent’ that eventually provided a simple starting point for 
designing the research programme (Gellner 1990: 1). When applied to Taiwan, this would 
become the question of what would happen when the political unit of ‘Taiwan’ no longer 
claimed to be congruent with the national unit of ‘China’.  
 
When faced by big and complex questions, such simple concepts are necessary for providing 
a clear thread to guide research. The complexity of my subject matter was certainly growing 
as identity politics, both ideationally and institutionally, began to be reshaped by the exercise 
of sovereignty through the ballot box in Taiwan. This provided an opportunity to develop 
theory as Gellner’s principle, which implies there can be no room for compromise, was 
challenged by creative political thinking that effectively loosened the bonds of ethnic Chinese 
nationalism in novel ways.  
 
Another advantage of using nationalist theory was that it allowed me to avoid getting bogged 
down in the fruitless arguments over rival historical claims over the status of Taiwan. At the 
start of the book I thus make it clear that I am only interested in how history was politicised 
by the two parties, not in trying to define Taiwan’s identity and status by finding some kind 
of archival proof. This meant that the first task of the contextual paragraph was thus to 
explain how the Chinese claim to Taiwan became a criterion for the leadership legitimacy of 
the two parties in the Chinese civil war, when the prospect of gaining control over the island 
arose during World War Two. The fact that I included evidence that the Communists had not 
seen Taiwan as part of China before this, including Mao Zedong’s 1936 remark to Edgar 
Snow that it should be helped in its struggle for independence from Japan, like Korea, 
probably explains why the work has never been honoured by publication in China (Snow 
1978: 128-9).  
 
The key claim to originality, however, would be to show what happened when ethnic Chinese 
nationalism collided with the forces of democratisation that were shaping a more civic 
conception. This led to one of the most exciting periods of my research, when I began to look 
at how people in Taiwan had been addressing the problems raised by theorists of nationalism 
for many years already. In this respect, it would be fair to say that a figure like Dr. Peng 
Ming-min, was some twenty years ahead of Anderson and Smith. As early as 1972, he had 
developed explored the relationship between political community and national identity in 
ways that challenged ethnic nationalism, publishing them during his exile in Canada in A 
Taste of Freedom (Peng 1972). This should be compulsory reading for all students of Taiwan 
and of nationalism in general.  
 
Central to Peng’s argument was the very modernist proposition that Taiwan should be 
understood as a ‘community of shared destiny’ (命運共同體). By this he meant that there 
was no more of an obligation for people who identify with a Chinese to all live in one China, 
any more than there is such an obligation for the Anglo Saxons scattered through Britain, the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to live in one state. Thanks to a collection 
of Dang Wai magazines on microfilm held at the British Library, I was able to trace how this 
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loosening of the bonds between ethnic and political identity was further developed by the 
most brilliant of the Taiwan’s dissident thinkers in the 1970s. These ideas were ultimately 
appropriated for the KMT in the 1990s by Lee Tenghui, who recast Peng’s conception of the 
nation as the Kantian conception of Gemeinschaft (生命共同體) and avoiding the use of the 
concept state (國) by referring to Taiwan as a ‘political entity’ (政治實體).  
 
Bigger than this historical challenge was how to follow the way in which these basic 
conceptions of national identity were being changed by the process of democratisation 
unfolding in Taiwan. Having been able to secure funding for my research from what was then 
the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom, I could do this in situ. 
Living in Taiwan I could take full advantage of the remarkable flourishing of journalism that 
took place as political constraints were eased.  
 
I developed a systematic method of building up a card index (personal computers were still 
rudimentary!) from reading several newspapers every day, representing views across the 
political spectrum. These included the United Daily News (聯合報), China Times (中國時
報) and the KMT’s official organ(中央日報); for the opposition, there was the Independence 
Morning Post (自立早報) and Independence Evening News （自立晚報）. As important as 
the record of events in these newspapers was the editorials and opinion pieces which 
provided remarkably high quality analysis and debates of government policies, political 
struggles and the profound issues of national identity politics. Finally there was the 
appearance of substantial monographs by leading political actors, as figures such as President 
Lee Teng-hui, or DPP Chair Hsu Hsin-liang （許信良）Leeattempted to explain their 
thinking on key issues relevant to my research. As an increasing number of books on 
Taiwanese identity and history appeared, there was now an embarrassment of riches when it 
came to research material.  
 
All of this contextual material was extremely useful for understanding the significance of the 
more mainstream sources of academic research, such as the statements, policy papers and 
election campaign materials issued by the government and political parties. By asking how 
these debates were addressing and shaping the basic concepts and principles of nationalist 
theory, it was not hard to develop the hypothesis that democratisation in Taiwan was 
stretching the idea of ‘one China’ but it was not clear towards what. Rather than assume that 
Chinese ethnic nationalism would be replaced by an equivalent kind of Taiwanese 
nationalism, it was more interesting to explore what would happening if external constraints 
forced something different to emerge. I decided to call this a ‘post-nationalist’ identity, 
because it would be based on subjective loyalty to the island but still shaped in significant 
ways by the demands of Chinese nationalism.  
 
This led to the second dimension of the research, which was to ask how democratisation and 
the practice of sovereignty in Taiwan could be compatible with the international system of 
sovereign states. The importance of this question was evident in the early 1990s as war 
erupted in the Balkans over secessionist movements from the former Yugoslavia. Given that 
the Chinese Communists were increasingly relying on nationalism to claim legitimacy after 
Tiananmen, it was important to ask whether creative thinking and diplomacy on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait would be able to avoid a descent into conflict. Even more interesting from 
the perspective of International Relations theory was to ask whether the international system 
itself could be flexible enough to adapt to whatever Taiwan was becoming. 
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The theoretical framework for this part of the thesis was influenced by James Mayall’s 
Nationalism and International Society (1993). Rooted in the English School approach to 
understanding world politics that was dominant at the LSE in those days, this focused on the 
international political dynamics that arise when the system of legally sovereign states is 
challenged by demands for self-determination made by sub-state or trans-state communities.  
 
In the 1990s, as economic globalization began to accelerate, it appeared that new political 
dynamics were creating opportunities to loosen the bonds of sovereignty and identity that a 
dynamic economy such as Taiwan might be well placed to exploit. The final part of the 
research was thus to look at how the restrictions of statehood imposed by international 
society were being weakened by Taiwan’s diplomacy resulting in a unique situation where 
the island was neither recognised as part of ‘China’ or as an independent sovereign state. It 
was to describe this phenomenon that I coined the term ‘intermediate state.’  
 
The concept was actually inspired by a passage in Hedley Bull’s seminal International 
Relations book, The Anarchical Society, where he discusses the alternatives to the current 
Westphalian international system of sovereign states and remarks: ‘the appearance of entities 
that remain transfixed between two statehoods might signal the decline of international 
society’ (Bull 1993: 267). This struck me as a very important proposition that the case of 
Taiwan appeared to contradict, because it was thriving in every way in a condition of being 
transfixed between the two possible statehoods of the PRC and a Taiwan enjoying diplomatic 
recognition from major states and the UN. By showing that democratisation had stretched the 
meaning of ‘China’ and that pragmatic diplomacy had allowed Taiwan to thrive in 
international society without diplomatic recognition, I could thus contribute to both 
nationalist and International Relations theory by proposing that the new concept of a ‘post-
nationalist entity in an intermediate state’ was needed to categorise Taiwan. 
 
My choice of theory was thus very much a product of the immediate post-Cold War period. 
My method was determined to a large extent by fast-changing circumstances. My training in 
intellectual history also steered me away from trying to evaluate the rational coherence of 
arguments over concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in favour of an analysis of how these 
were deployed in the political strategies of people were thinking and acting to resolve a 
variety of problems in a fast-changing situation. To paraphrase what Joseph Levenson 
recommended in his book on the fate of Confucianism, it was not a history not of thought that 
was required but an understanding of how people were thinking, that could reveal all the 
creativity, imagination and constructive ambiguity that this involves. 
 
Once I had a clear research question, the best way to do this was to just to absorb, catalogue 
and analyse as much information as possible in the immediate environment. While such an 
approach might not sound particularly scientific, it has produced outstanding results in other 
cases. Perhaps the best example is the twentieth-century’s foremost China watcher, Simon 
Leys (the pen name of Pierre Ryckmans), who prided himself on being able to predict more 
about what would happen in China than the best-trained social scientists by merely talking to 
Chinese friends and reading the daily newspapers from that country (Leys 1989).  
 
This method is certainly even more necessary when you are living through a period of fast 
political change. Like most foreign scholars doing research in Taiwan at the early stage of 
their career, I benefitted immensely from talking to people who I met not just socially but 
also through work. This included as an English teacher for adult learners, and as a translator 
at the Government Information Office-sponsored multilingual magazine Sinorama (光華雜
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誌). It was enlightening and uplifting to witness how journalists and editors reacted to the 
shifting political environment, taking advantage of the growing confusion in the ideological 
guidelines from above to branch out into areas that were formerly considered taboo. This 
would be a research project worth conducting in itself.  
 
Whereas I had started the research with a dearth of material, therefore, the main problem had 
become one of keeping up with the tidal wave of information and knowing where to stop. It 
was only by having a clear set of questions rooted in nationalist theory that this could be 
made manageable. This could allow me to mine the data to gain insights into how political 
actors were changing the meaning of nation, state and sovereignty as they pursued power and 
legitimacy in a democratising system. 
 
Main findings and arguments in the book 
 
The main finding of the project was that the processes of democratization, domestic political 
negotiation and compromise and diplomacy had shown how malleable the idea of the nation 
could become. This could be demonstrated by tracing in detail every painful step in the 
search for ways to navigate around the concept of the Chinese nation that had been used to 
legitimate the rule of the both the KMT and the CCP. While fully understanding the desire of 
many people in Taiwan to reject Chinese identity, it was clear that threats from conservative 
forces inside Taiwan and from the Chinese Communists meant that the instability followed 
by a declaration of independence was a too high for most people to want to pay. It was 
equally important to recognise that political actors and decision-makers could not ignore the 
positive economic possibilities presented by being part of a trans-national Chinese identity.  
 
It was my hope that combining categorising Taiwan as ‘a post-nationalist entity in an 
intermediate state’ could capture the dynamics of what appeared to be an enduring situation. 
Although this somewhat convoluted formulation came to me at the end of the research, it 
seemed to be a way to challenge the assumption that Taiwan had to choose between being 
either part of ‘China’ or recognised as ‘independent,’ both of which terms are rarely defined. 
All the domestic and international dynamics appeared to be pointing to the fact that it would 
have to find its own, unique way to survive between these two possibilities for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
I also hoped that this concept could contribute to the broader debates on nationalism. This is 
because the idea of a ‘post-nationalist’ identity can be understood as going beyond an 
inherited national identity but is not the same as entirely negating it. The evidence supported 
this in the case of Taiwan, because ways were being sought to keep ‘Chineseness’ as a valued 
part of many people’s identity, so long as it was separated from the principles of statehood 
and political legitimacy. 
 
I also hoped that the idea of the ‘intermediate state’ could contribute to debates in 
International Relations theory, especially as notions of statehood were becoming increasingly 
elastic under the impact of globalisation. Rather than assume that Taiwan was posing a threat 
to the international system (as many of its critics were trying to say and Bull’s comments 
would seem to imply), it was more interesting to explore how ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ was 
creating a new kind of international dispensation. This could be seen in the use of 
imaginative concepts, such as the ‘substantive relations’ forged with Japan and the US and 
the ‘reciprocal recognition’ used to build links with small states. Then there was the host of 
creative practices that Taiwan’s politicians and diplomats began to develop in order to create 
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international space, such as ‘dollar diplomacy’ and even the ‘vacation diplomacy’ used to 
maintain links with Southeast Asian states by sending government personnel there for their 
‘holidays’. 
 
By looking at Taiwan in this way it was possible to side-step the temptation to make a moral 
judgement about whether Taiwan ought to be either independent or unified with China. 
Instead, such a perspective made it possible to evaluate how Taiwan was actually using its 
often-understated economic, diplomatic and cultural strengths to create a special niche in the 
international system. Those strengths were especially evident on the economic side in the 
1990s, when Taiwan still had a lead over the PRC in many respects. Moreover, by 
developing the flexible concept of a ‘political entity’ (政治實體) instead of ‘state’, it was 
well-placed to align with trends that were eroding the nation-state, namely regionalisation, 
globalisation and the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation. When the Lee Teng-hui 
administration was forced by opposing domestic and international pressures to propose that 
that there might be something called ‘one China’, but that Taiwan and the PRC had different 
governments within it, something quite revolutionary was happening from the perspective of 
International Relations theory. 
 
It is my greatest regret about the book that the concept of Taiwan as a ‘post-nationalist 
identity in an intermediate state’ was not taken up more broadly by academics. I still think 
this is useful for explaining the situation that has been created as political actors in Taiwan 
have had to meet the challenge of explaining and articulating the nature of Taiwan’s unique 
international situation to widely different audiences at home, in the PRC and in international 
society more generally. The need to ameliorate pressures maintaining the myth of ‘one 
china’, while making it clear that sovereignty is practiced by the people of Taiwan through 
the ballot box, has not gone away since the book was published.  
 
While the lack of diplomatic recognition is undoubtedly a source of great frustration for the 
majority of people in Taiwan, it is to the credit of the island’s politicians and policy makers 
that creative thinking has allowed a pluralist form of post-nationalist identity to emerge on 
the back of a flourishing civil society at home. At the same time, despite periods of tension 
and often vicious rhetoric from Beijing, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have benefited 
enormously from the forging of special economic and cultural links. The consolidation of 
Taiwan’s subjectivity might have been constrained by the attraction of the Chinese economy 
and enduring family and cultural links, but the result has been a metamorphosis of identity 
politics rather than the kind of collapse into communal violence seen in other parts of the 
world since the Cold War.  
 
When faced by pessimism concerning Taiwan’s future that seems to be pervasive on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, I thus like to point out the remarkable achievements that have been 
made by avoiding the assumption that only zero-sum outcomes are possible. This has become 
even more important to recognise as democratisation and the lack of diplomatic recognition 
has forced Taiwan to continue to deconstruct nationalism, while there has been a hardening 
of ethnic Chinese nationalism in the PRC, due to the ideological crisis of the CCP and the 
political and cultural impact of globalisation. The case of Taiwan thus provides rich insights 
into the possibilities for crisis management, building international stability and even for the 
development of nationalism in China itself. 
 
Given that events have borne out my hypothesis, I would not have approached the project any 
differently with the benefit of hindsight. This is also due to the practical reason that 
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developing and using a more sophisticated methodology would have been very difficult due 
to the fact that I was really running to keep up with events. It should also be remembered that 
there was virtually no secondary literature to draw on, given the speed of change. Finally, it is 
easy to forget just how sensitive the topic was at the time.  
 
It should be clear from the above, however, that working on an unfolding and sensitive topic 
does have great advantages. I was delighted and surprised when the PhD thesis was awarded 
the British International Studies Association prize in 1997, despite the fact that it was not 
possible to include the Taiwan Strait crisis that developed from the summer of 1995 through 
the first presidential election in 1996. The pleasure of receiving this accolade was only 
accentuated by the fact that my fellow research students at the LSE had treated my topic as a 
bit of a joke, wondering why I was bothering to work on a such an insignificant issue as a 
faraway, authoritarian ruled island. 
 
The Straits crisis of 1995-96 may well have helped me to get the contract to publish the thesis 
as a Routledge monograph. The fact that the quick return to the status quo ante made it 
relatively easy to integrate those events into the text seems to attest to the robustness of my 
main hypothesis about the durability of the political dispensation. I was very pleased to be 
able to summarize the core of my argument in a single chapter in a volume on Asian 
nationalism edited by Michael Leifer (Hughes 2000). I certainly regret that I did not do more 
to build on the growing interest after publication, due to pressures of job-hunting and family. 
I would urge all scholars to avoid making that mistake, no matter how overwhelmed you 
might be with other tasks and issues. 
 
I was very pleased to have a glowing review from Professor June Dreyer at Miami 
University, however. As more scholars in the United States began to pay attention to Taiwan 
after the crisis I also received emails expressing their gratitude for the detailed and 
dispassionate explanation I had provided of the linkage between Taiwan’s complex domestic 
politics and cross-Strait relations. The work has steadily gained more attention as Taiwan has 
become one of the most important case studies in the social sciences and Taiwan studies has 
grown from strength to strength. I was delighted when a second edition was published as a 
much more affordable softback in 2014 and then as a Kindle version. I am absolutely 
delighted to have played my part in the growing community of academics who have put 
Taiwan on the academic map in the 1990s.  
 
The field has developed in ways that were unimaginable when I started my project, especially 
with the very advanced methods used by scholars working on topics from elections, cultural 
and anthropological studies of identity, or political economy research into the role of the 
Taishang. My main consolation is that Taiwan has continued to develop its unique status and 
identity and avoided the kind of violent conflict witnessed in so many parts of the world over 
identity politics and nationalism, even as China power has grown to  
exceed what most people expected when I was doing my research in the 1990s.  
 
Equally positive is the way in which ethnic Chinese nationalism has been deconstructed in 
Taiwan and replaced by a post nationalist identity that has exceeded all expectations in its 
degree of liberal diversity and social pluralism. This has been an immense source of power in 
itself, as the international system has to accommodate the existence of a significant entity that 
is neither a part of the PRC not a state that enjoys diplomatic recognition. Central to this is 
the behaviour of the most important actors, namely Taiwan, the PRC and the US. Perhaps 
most remarkable of all is the way in which the concept of Taiwan as a ‘community of shared 
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destiny’ that was coined by Peng Ming-min, the father of the independence movement, and 
appropriated by Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s, has now been taken up and applied to PRC 
diplomacy by none other than President Xi Jinping! 
 
Overall, therefore, the book might be considered a snapshot of the early stage of a remarkable 
process that is still unfolding. I have taken every effort to keep on top of developments down 
to the present day. In particular, I have made it a priority to be present in Taiwan for every 
presidential election, although I had to miss the 2016 contest due to my duties as Head of 
Department at the time. I have also attended countless conferences and workshops on cross-
Strait Relations over the years, in both Taiwan and the PRC. I have used the information 
from this fieldwork to produce a series of journal articles that explore the relationship 
between elections and the formation of identity in Taiwan, with some special emphasis on 
how the PRC adapts to this and takes part in shaping it (Hughes 2002; 2009; 2008; 2011; 
2014). As my status in the academic profession has improved, I have also had the benefit and 
pleasure of being able to gain more access to members of the political elite. Of course, we 
have some very important LSE alumni in Taiwan.  
 
As my academic research and teaching has developed to cover the international politics of the 
Asia-Pacific region, however, I must also be honest in admitting that I cannot pretend to be 
able to compete with the growing number of scholars who have focused entirely on Taiwan 
throughout their careers. Most humbling is the amazing work conducted by Taiwanese social 
scientists themselves. When confronted by such formidable competition, my best hope for 
doing anything valuable is to continue to try to identify the cutting-edge themes that nobody 
else is yet working on.  
 
I still believe that the fate of Taiwan will to an important degree determine and be determined 
by the evolution of nationalism in China. However, given the now abundant work on Chinese 
nationalism, I have chosen to focus more specifically on the problem of Chinese militarism. 
This issue has become increasingly salient in recent years yet remains shockingly under-
researched. Taiwan is also an important case study in itself for understanding the political 
dynamics of militarism, having been the subject of intense militarization under both the 
Japanese occupation and KMT administration. It thus presents a case for understanding not 
only the political dynamics of using military values and practices to discipline a society but, 
even more importantly, it is the only case of de-militarization in a society that was shaped by 
the hegemony of Chinese nationalism for several decades. Exploring how the political 
dynamics of how Taiwan’s democratization have achieved this would perhaps be a most 
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